The Calypso Caliphate: How Trinidad Became a Recruiting Ground for ISIS by Cottee, Simon
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Cottee, Simon  (2019) The Calypso Caliphate: How Trinidad Became a Recruiting Ground for
ISIS.   International Affairs .    ISSN 0020-5850.    (In press)
DOI






The Calypso Caliphate: How Trinidad Became a Recruiting 




Trinidad and Tobago (T&T), a small twin-Island republic in the Caribbean, has one of 
the highest rates of foreign fighter radicalization in the western hemisphere. Accord-
ing to official estimates, around 130 Trinidadian nationals migrated to ISIS-controlled 
territory in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2016. This article seeks to make sense of 
these migrations, placing them in the broader historical and social context in which 
they occurred. Drawing on a range of quantitative and qualitative primary source-
material, the article finds, contrary to expectation, that the archetypal adult ISIS trav-
eller from T&T is not a marginalized, youthful and mostly male city dweller who rad-
icalized outside of a mosque, but is in fact as likely to be female as male, who is in his 
or her mid-30s, married, has children, attends a mosque, lives in a rural area, and has 
suffered neither the pains of economic hardship nor the ill-effects of marginalization 
from the wider society because of his or her Muslim identity. As well as emphasizing 
the intersection between the local and the global in jihadist foreign traveller mobiliza-
tions, the article also demonstrates the importance of personal connections in the m-
grations of Trinidadians to Syria and Iraq, lending further support to research on the 





In 2016, when ISIS or the so-called Islamic State still controlled vast areas of territory in 
Syria and Iraq, the group published issue 15 of its online magazine Dabiq.1 Titled “Break the 
Cross”, it was full of violent condemnations and warnings against multiple enemies, with a 
particular focus on “pagan Christians”. It also contained, in what had become a standard 
feature, an interview with an ISIS foreign fighter. “When I was around twenty years old I 
would come to accept the religion of truth, Islam”,2 said Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi, recalling how 
he had turned away from the Christian faith he was born into. At-Trinidadi, as his nom de 
guerra or kunya suggests, was from T&T, a country more readily associated with calypso and 
carnival than the “caliphate”. Asked if he had a message for “the Muslims of Trinidad”, he 
castigated his co-religionists at home for remaining in “a place where you have no honor and 
are forced to live in humiliation, subjugated by the disbelievers”.3  
This message was aimed not just at T&T’s East Indian Muslim population, who make up the 
majority of Muslims in the country, but also at Black-Afro Trinidadian Muslim “reverts”, 
particularly those associated with the Jamaat al Muslimeen (JAM), a fringe group which tried 
to overthrow the government of T&T in July 1990.4 
More chillingly, Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi urged Muslims in T&T to wage jihad against their 
fellow citizens: “Terrify the disbelievers in their own homes and make their streets run with 
their blood.”5 
Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi’s real name was Shane Crawford, a former criminal with a history of 
violence. Before the interview with Dabiq only a few Trinidadians had heard of him, but after 
it he became badge of a national shame in Trinidad. It also made him a marked man, and in 
February 2017 he succumbed to his wounds from a U.S. drone strike. Crawford’s legacy, 
however, remains: he was one of the first Trinidadian nationals to join ISIS in Syria. By the 
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time the U.S. State Department added him to its list of “Specially Designated Global Terror-
ists” in March 20176 at least 130 of his fellow nationals had migrated to ISIS-controlled terri-
tory in Syria and Iraq. 
This article aims to map and make sense of these migrations. How was a nascent, self-
proclaimed Islamic State, situated around 10,000 kilometres from a relatively prosperous 
western democracy at the southernmost point of the Caribbean archipelago, able to capture 
the hearts and minds of a small number of citizens of that democratic country, prompting 
them to desert it for a new life in the so-called caliphate? What combination of attractions (to 
do with the newly emergent caliphate in 2014-2015) and repulsions (to do with Trinidad) 
propelled them, and what were the enabling conditions that facilitated their moral and 
physical journeys? The article suggests that the the genesis of the 2013-16 migrations can be 
traced to a social network of around 350 like-minded individuals located in three geographic 
areas of T&T: Chaguanas, in west-central Trinidad, Diego Martin in the north-west and Rio 
Claro in the south-east. At the heart of this network is the Umar Ibn Khattab mosque, located 
in Boos Village, Rio Claro, where Nazim Mohammed is the imam. For many years, 
Mohammed’s network was able to operate in Trinidad with almost total impunity, not only 
spreading its hardcore salafi beliefs across the country but also implementing a parallel-
system of sharia law in Rio Claro. 
The article is divided into four parts. The first gives an overview of the academic literature on 
western ISIS-affiliated foreign fighters. The second presents data on the biographical profiles 
of Trinidadian ISIS migrants (TIMs). The third provides an account of the genesis of the 
2013 and 2016 migrations, while the fourth and concluding part of the article addresses the 




This article is based on more than 50 semi-structured interviews conducted during the course 
of 8 two-week-long fieldtrips to Trinidad between February 2016 and August 2018. I inter-
viewed key figures in the Islamic/Islamist milieu in T&T, including Imam Nazim Moham-
med (head of the Umar Ibn Khattab mosque) Umar Abdullah (head of the Waajihatul Is-
laamiyyah (The Islamic Front)), Kwesi Atiba (a former JAM member and imam at the Islam-
ic Resource Center), Imtiaz Mohammed (President of the Islamic Missionaries Guild), Hasan 
Anyabwile (a London-based sheikh and former member of the JAM), Fuad Abu Bakr (the 
son of the JAM’s leader Yasin Abu Bakr) and Inshan Ishmael (head of the Muslim Social and 
Cultural Foundation). I visited several mosques in Trinidad, where I interviewed worshippers 
and imams and participated in Eid celebrations. I also interviewed an undercover police of-
ficer; a homicide police detective; the head of the T&T Police Service’s (TTPS) Special 
Branch division, as well as several former members of that division; three local journalists 
who have written widely about TIMs; a former Minister of National Security (Gary Griffith) 
who was in office when the first cohort of TIMs left for Syria and Iraq; a local criminologist 
who is an expert on jihadist discourse (Daurius Figueira); and several family members and 
friends of TIMs, including the mother of Shane Crawford. 
Most of the interviews were recorded and transcribed, and many interviewees were inter-
viewed more than once. Unfortunately I was not able to interview any TIMs (when I first 
started conducting interviews in early 2016 most of the adult male TIMs had been killed). 
In addition to the interviews, the article also draws on two sources of data on the demograph-
ic profiles of TIMs: a T&T Guardian news story on a leaked police file containing infor-
mation on 102 TIMs and a comprehensive database of 70 TIMs who departed from Trinidad 
between November 2013 and March 2015. In compiling this database I was helped by an 
anonymous T&T police source, two local journalists and several members of T&T’s Muslim 
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communities. I also conducted a year-long investigation into the social media activities of 
pro-ISIS supporters in T&T, including those of 12 TIMs. 
 




What Do We Know About Western ISIS Foreign Fighters?7 
 
The short answer to this question is quite a bit, although not a vast amount. We have a very 
rough idea of how many people joined ISIS, which countries they came from and in what 
numbers, and how many returned to their countries of origin.8 We have a decent picture of 
the profiles of ISIS foreign fighters from Europe and North America,9 although we don’t 
have any reliable data on those from Middle Eastern countries. We know far less about the 
activities and roles of foreign fighters once they migrated to ISIS-controlled territory in Syria 
and Iraq, and we possess little in the way of rich qualitative data on the subjectivities and life-
histories of foreign fighters.10  
According to the Soufan Group, between 27,000 and 31,000 people traveled to Syria and Iraq 
to join ISIS and other violent extremist groups from at least 86 countries.11 Among countries 
in western Europe, France has the highest number (1,700), followed by Germany (760), the 
United Kingdom (760), and Belgium (470),12 which, according to authors of the report, 
“top[s] the poll for the highest number of fighters per capita”.13  
In a more recent study, based on 33,815 foreign fighters from 103 countries, Elena Pokalova 
estimates that the preeminent exporters of ISIS foreign fighters, per capita, are, in first place, 
Tunisia, followed by Maldives, Jordan, Lebanon, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, T&T, Libya, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, and Saudi Arabia.14 
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Joana Cook and Gina Vale, in the most up-to-date report on ISIS migrants, provide another 
layer of nuance by disaggregating the number of foreign men, women and minors who trav-
elled to, or were born in, ISIS-controlled territory.15 Drawing on figures reported between 
April 2013 and June 2018,16 they find that among the 41,490 international citizens from 80 
countries who became affiliated with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, up to 4,761 (13%) were women, 
while 4,640 (12%) were minors;17 75% were men.18 
There is a growing literature on the demographic profiles of ISIS foreign fighters from west-
ern Europe and North America.19 All of the main studies echo what has now become a cliché 
in both scholarly and popular discourses on ISIS foreign fighters: namely, that there is no 
single profile of an ISIS foreign fighter.20 At the same time, most of the studies testify to an 
emergent pattern: western ISIS foreign fighters are typically young (early to mid-20s), lower-
class, second-generation Muslim males from urban areas.21  
A particularly striking finding across the literature is the disproportionate number of converts 
and former criminals.22 Many studies also find that western ISIS foreign fighters tend to be 
poorly educated and had radicalized in social scenes outside of mosques.23 
What explains the phenomenon of western ISIS foreign fighters? The literature on this can be 
divided into three levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro. Some studies combine all three 
levels of analysis. 
The micro-level focuses on the subjective motivational states of ISIS foreign fighters.24 The 
question at issue is, “what drove them to join ISIS?” Often, the answer is framed in terms of 
“push” and “pull” factors, making a distinction between what is attractive or felt to be attrac-
tive about ISIS that “pulls” people to join it and what is prohibitive or felt to be prohibitive 
about the joiners own society that “pushes” them to search for radical alternatives. “Pulls” 
include sharia implementation, the privileging of martial and “heroic” values, moral absolut-
ism, spiritual salvation, solidarity, the prohibition on free mixing of the sexes, and zero toler-
ance of same-sex relationships, whereas “pushes” encompass “militant” secularism, “soul-
less” materialism, sexual permissiveness, racial discrimination and other perceived injustices, 
multiculturalism, moral relativism, feminism, military intervention in Muslim majority coun-
tries, democracy and boredom. The literature has yet to produce a consensus, and is divided 
on the question of how causally salient religion (i.e. Islam) is in the cocktail of motivational 
states that lie behind the ISIS foreign fighter phenomenon.25 
Whereas micro-level studies look at the internal world of western ISIS foreign fighters, meso-
level scholarship focuses on the social networks to which they belong or belonged26 Th  
question it seeks to answer is, “what or who facilitated their recruitment to ISIS?” This re-
search is also divided: between studies that emphasize the role of “top-down” recruitment 
dynamics, whereby potential recruits are brought into the fold by influential activists and 
clerics, and those which emphasize “bottom-up” recruitment dynamics, whereby the initiative 
and curiosity of the recruit propels them toward radical networks.27 
In contrast to both micro- and meso-levels of analysis, the macro focuses on the deeper struc-
tural conditions that created not only the networks that facilitated recruitment to ISIS, but al-
so served to generate the motivational states that made joining the group seem like an attrac-
tive or necessary choice for those who joined. The question it seeks to answer is, “what are 
the root causes or key drivers of the western ISIS foreign fighter phenomenon”? Broadly 
speaking, there are 3 key competing explanatory models here: economic, cultural and existen-
tial. The first posits that economic inequality within Muslim diaspora communities in the 
west creates a reservoir of frustration and resentment on which violent extremism thrives; 
joining ISIS, from this perspective, is form of rebellion against a systematically unfair society 
that offers few opportunities for success and betterment.28 The second (and related) model 
focuses on the disaffections of second and third generation Muslims in the west, portraying 
contemporary western societies as increasingly hostile and discriminatory toward Muslim 
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minorities and Islam; joining ISIS, from this perspective, is rooted in alienation from the west 
and reflects a keenly felt need for belonging, respect and recognition.29 And the third ex-
planatory model shifts the focus towards the decline of grand narratives – particularly mascu-
linist notions of honor and martial prowess – in late-modern societies; joining ISIS, from this 
perspective, is borne out of a profound disillusionment with a secular liberal society devoid 
of moral direction and distinction, as well as a longing for ultimate meaning rooted in total 
and violent self-sacrifice to a sacred cause.30 
 
What Do We Know About ISIS Foreign Fighters and Migrants From Trin-
idad and Tobago? 
 
The Leaked Police File 
 
The official number of Trinidadian nationals who journeyed to Syria and Iraq between 2013 
and 2016 is around 130.31 This may well be a conservative estimate, although it seems un-
likely to be as high as 400, as one opposition Member of Parliament claimed in April 2016.32
One hundred-and-thirty may seem like a trifling number, but it easily places T&T, with a 
population of 1.3 million,33 including 104,000 Muslims,34 top of the list of western countries 
with the highest rates of foreign-fighter radicalization. As John McCoy and Andy Knight ex-
plain in a 2016 paper on violent extremism in T&T: 
 
If the high end of the estimate [approx. 130] is accurate, this would equate into a rate 
of 96 individuals (per million) - a rate that is roughly double that of Belgium, which, 
according to data collected from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisa-




Who are these 130 Trinidadian nationals? McCoy and Knight’s paper, though excellent as an 
overview of the radical Islamist scene in T&T, provides no hard data on the demographic 
profiles of those who left Trinidad to join ISIS. But a T&T Guardian news story, published 
after McCoy and Knight’s article went to press, sheds some light on who they are.36 The 
Guardian story is based on a 50-page leaked police file on 102 individuals who left Trinidad 
between 2013 and mid-2015.37 Thirty-one percent are males between the ages of 30 and 50, 
29% are females between the ages of 30 and 40, and 39% are minors are between the ages of 
2 and 16. Among the 102 are 20 families (see Figure 1). Most are affiliated to mosques in Rio 










(Source: T&T Guardian) 
 
The article discloses few other details on the profiles of those listed in the police document. 
But the little it does relay is striking enough. This is for two reasons. First, the percentage of 
women is remarkable, with a 1:1 ratio of women to men. This places T&T third in the top 5 








(Source: Cook and Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’”, and T&T Guardian; the maximum of 




Second, the percentage of Trinidadian minors going to Syria and Iraq – almost 40% - is 
similarly very high, placing T&T third in the top 5 countries with the highest proportion of 








(Source: Cook and Vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’”, and T&T Guardian; the maximum of 
the range for Kazakhstan and France was used) 
 
The Database of 70 TIMs 
 
A far more detailed picture of the demographic profiles of TIMs emerges from a database of 
70 TIMs compiled by the author. It relates to the first wave which departed between 
November 2013 and March 2015, and provides statistical information on the following 
variables: full names and kunyas; age; gender; date of departure from T&T; level of 
education; occupation; socio-economic background; marital status; number of converts; 
criminal record; place of residence; mosque affiliation; number of individuals killed; and 
number of returnees. 
 
Age and Gender 
 
Of the 70 individuals in the database, 34% are male, 23% are female, 9% are teenagers in the 
13-15 age bracket and 34% are children under the age of 13. Hence the total percentage of 
minors is 43%, while the ratio of men to women is 3:2, which still places T&T at the top of 
the list of western countries with the highest proportion of female ISIS travelers (40%). 
The average age for the 40 adults is 34 at the time of departure. The average age for mal s is 
35, while the average age for females is 33. These averages are unusual compared to those 
found for other western ISIS contingents. Bibi van Ginkel and Eva Entenmann estimate that 
the majority of British foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are aged between 18 and 30.40 
Estimates for the average age of their German, Swedish, Dutch, Belgian and American 
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counterparts are (respectively) 26.5,41 26,42 23.2,43 23.844 and 26.9.45 In other words, adult 
TIMs are on average nearly a decade older than their European and American counterparts. 
It is not clear what explains this discrepancy, although it is possible that the financial costs of 
travelling from Trinidad to Syria or Iraq – a trip that would cost around $2,300 - may have 
prevented pro-ISIS supporters from a younger demographic in the country from going. 
Regardless, the relative maturity of most adult TIMs suggests that however one is to 
understand the meaning and appeal of the ISIS subculture in Trinidad it is unlikely to be 
illuminated by viewing it primarily as a youth revolt.46  
 
Date of Departure 
 
Four Trinidadians left Trinidad for Syria in 2013: Shane Crawford and his wife, Milton 
Algernon and Stuart Mohamed. Between January 2014 and July 2014 none left, but from 
August 2014 to December 2014 a total of 30 adults departed. The remainder of adults left 
between January 2015 and March 2015. It is likely that the spike in departures between 
August 2014 and December 2014 owed to the historic declaration of caliphate in late June 
2014 by ISIS’s chief spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani,47 as well as to the huge 
international exposure ISIS had attracted throughout the summer of 2014. 
 
Level of Education 
 
Regarding the level of education of adult TIMs, 65% graduated from secondary school; and 7 
– 18% - graduated from a tertiary-level institution (including 2 who had attended the 
University of Medina in Saudi Arabia). To put this into context, the World Bank estimates, 
based on data collected in 2010, that the percentage of the population in T&T aged 30-34 
with a completed secondary education was 68%,48 while in 2001, when the average adult 
TIM would have been in their late teens, the participation rate in tertiary education in T&T 
was just 7%.49 By local standards, then, the educational level of adult TIMs in the database is 




The majority of adults (55%) are unskilled. This number includes most of the females, who 
were homemakers in T&T, as well as self-employed males, who earned their living farming 
or plying vehicles for hire. Twenty percent are skilled, 15% semi/mixed skilled and 10% 
professional. Just one TIM was unemployed at the time of his departure to Syria or Iraq. 
Occupations at the time of departure were startlingly diverse: a secondary school teacher, a 
truck driver, an agricultural laborer, an auto mechanic, an offshore welder, a marine safety 
technician, a taxi driver, a building contractor, a cell-phone store owner, a professional 




The vast majority of adults - 90% - can be categorized as middle-class, while 10% can be 
categorized as lower-class.50 None of the TIMs were economically impoverished and quite a 
few were indeed from the higher echelons of Trinidadian society: two in the database were 
lawyers, one was a doctor, and another was the son of an extremely wealthy East Indian 







The database contains information on the marital status of 22 males and 15 females. Of the 
22 males, 77% were married at the time of their departure to Syria or Iraq, whereas of the 15 
females, all but one (93%) were married at the time of their departure and travelled with their 
husband. The sole woman who was not married was the 18 year-old daughter of a male TIM 
who took his entire family of 8 to Syria. In other words, no woman in the database travelled 
independently or alone to Syria and Iraq. 
In the European context, by contrast, large numbers of unmarried males travelled to Syria and 
Iraq, often together, and in not a few cases, unmarried teenage girls and women also travelled 
alone or together. Van Ginkel and Entenmann observe that “information from five 
[European] countries indicates that around half [of all departed foreign fighters – men and 
women] are married”.51 Thus the clichéd and much derided notion of the “jihadi bride”52 is 
singularly ill-suited to T&T, since all the adult TIMs in the database – with the exception of 
an 18 year-old daughter who was taken to Syria against her will - were already married. And 
while it cannot be conclusively ruled out the male TIMs were not motivated in part by the 
desire to marry additional women in Syria/Iraq or to acquire for themselves a sex slave it 
seems that for the majority of those who took their wives and children these considerations 
would have been far from their minds. 
 
Number of Converts 
 
In his Dabiq interview Shane Crawford, who himself was a convert to Islam, speculated that 
“about 60% of the mujahidin from Trinidad here in the lands of the Caliphate come from 
Muslim families, with the remaining 40% or so being converts”.53 The database supports this 
line of speculation. Of the 40 TIMs, 43% are converts, while 38% were born into the faith; 
information on faith at birth for the remaining 20.0% was not available (see Figure 4). This 
reflects an established pattern in foreign fighter cohorts from other western countries, which 
is that converts, constituting just a tiny percentage of the total population of Muslims in those 
countries, are substantially overrepresented.54 Van Ginkel and Entenmann estimate that for 
European countries with higher numbers of foreign fighters, between 6% and 23% are con-
verts.55 Yet no other country comes even close to the percentage of converts seen in the T&T 
case. However, it should be noted that while converts are estimated at around 1%-2% of the 
total Muslim population in most European countries, in T%T they constitute around 28% of 










The overrepresentation of converts in the TIM contingent lends support to the view that 
converts are particularly vulnerable to radicalization, due to either their lack of grounding in 
Islam, or because, due to their marginality from both the new faith community into which 
they converted and the former community out of which they moved they are susceptible to 




Thirty per cent had a criminal record or were involved in criminal activities prior to their 
departure, while the majority – 70% - did not. This is broadly in line with research on 
European foreign fighters: roughly 20% of Belgian and Dutch foreign fighters were suspected 
of criminal activity prior to leaving for Syria/Iraq,58 while for Italy 21% of foreign fighters 
had a criminal record,59 and for Spain one-third did.60 
The majority of TIMs with a criminal record or suspected involvement in criminal enterprises 
were men (83%). The seriousness of the offences for which they were charged varies, ranging 
from common assault to drug dealing and murder. The two women with criminal records 
were jointly charged with their husbands for possession of illegal arms and ammunition. It is 
striking that the first cohort of Trinidadians which left for Syria in December 2013 were all 
(with the exception of Crawford’s wife) fugitives who faced murder charges in T&T. 
 
Place of Residence and Mosque Affiliation 
 
In the main, TIMs come from three areas in Trinidad: Rio Claro, Chaguanas and Diego 
Martin. The majority – nearly 70% - lived in Rio Claro before they mobilized for Syria/Iraq, 
on or near the Boos Settlement Muslim community led by Nazim Mohammed. 
All TIMs attended salafi mosques: Masjid Umar Ibn Khattab in Rio Claro, Masjid Ul 
Khaleefah in Longdenville (Chaguanas), Enterprise Community Masjid (Chaguanas) and 
Masjid Us Sunnah in Barataria (in the north-west). Some were affiliated with more than one 
mosque. Milton Algernon and Anthony Hamlet, for example, frequented both Masjid Umar 
Ibn Khattab and Enterprise Community Masjid (Chaguanas), while Zaid Abdul Hamid, who 




This high degree of geographic clustering is mirrored in ISIS mobilizations elsewhere62 and 
lends further support to the thesis that the key to understanding radicalization and foreign 
fighter mobilizations lies in tracing the social networks that bind violent extremists together. 
At the same time, it also lends further support to skeptical voices which challenge the wisdom 
of focusing so much research attention on online radicalization and extremist “virtual 
spaces”, not because these spaces are unimportant, but because the relationships that matter 
most in violent radicalization are conducted in physical spaces in or near to social settings 
where people live.63 
 
Number of Individuals Killed and Number of Returnees 
 
According to an anonymous source from within the T&T Ministry of National Security, as 
of January 2018, a total of 30 male TIMs have been killed in Syria and Iraq. As far as I know, 
no adult male TIM has yet returned to T&T. (Cook and Vale estimate that 793 males have 
returned to western Europe from Syria and Iraq.64) The former Minister of National Security 
Gary Griffith told me, “At no time have I ever received such data to believe that fighters from 
Trinidad have returned.”65 There is no indication that this has changed since Griffith’s depar-
ture from office in 2015. 
Among the female contingent, one woman and her two teenage step-daughters have returned 
to Trinidad.66 According to T&T’s Counter Trafficking Unit, this woman was duped by her 
husband into going to Syria: she thought she was going on a family vacation. Her husband 
and his three boys remained in Syria.67 This was in 2014. 
In December 2015 it was reported that four Trinidadian males were among 961 persons held 
at the Turkish border by Turkish authorities.68 And in January 2018, Edmund Dillon 
disclosed to the T&T parliament that, following ISIS’s territorial defeats in Mosul and Raqqa, 
a group of Trinis were being held at a detention camp in Iraq.69 Aneesa Waheed, the daughter 
of Nazim Mohammed, and her husband Daud Waheed were among this group. In May 2018 
Aneesa Waheed was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by a court in Baghdad.70 
In addition to the 130 or so Trinidadians who traveled to Syria and Iraq, there is an unknown 
number who tried to go, but failed and remain in T&T. Among these are the 12 Trinidadian 
nationals who were captured trying to cross the border into Syria by the Turkish authorities in 
July 2016. They were deported back to T&T in April 2017.71 There are probably many more 
who wanted to leave, but for whatever reason couldn’t or chose not to do so. 
Given the severe methodological difficulties of recovering the motives of deceased foreign 
fighters, the database contains no information on the motives of TIMs. 
In summary: While in western Europe and North America the median ISIS traveller is an 
urban, unmarried lower-class Muslim male in his early to mid-twenties and of immigrant 
background, in T&T he or she is a married Muslim male or female in his or her mid-thirties, 
who is a parent, who is financially stable, who is of Trinidadian background, and who comes 
from a rural area and belongs to a mosque.  
 
The Genesis of the 2013-2016 Migrations 
 
One of the most striking features about the entire cohort of TIMs is just how networked - 
indeed incestuous - it was. Everyone in it was connected to everyone else. They all knew 
each other, either because they were friends or were related. It was mothers and daughters, 
fathers and sons, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives. And when the men started getting 
killed in Syria and Iraq their widows married the remaining male Trinidadian fighters.  
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In all, at least 26 Trinidadian families went to live in the caliphate. Of these, the biggest was 
the Mohammed family, headed by Imam Nazim. Reports vary, but it is likely that some 15 
members of his family left. 
It is difficult to know how each TIM radicalized or what motivated them to go to Syria or 
Iraq, given that so much about them remains hidden or unknown. But the crucial, 
transformative moment in their life-stories was their exposure to the pro-ISIS network in 
Trinidad, which would have provided them with the social, ideological and material support 
for embracing ISIS’s worldview and journeying to ISIS-controlled territory in Syria and 
Iraq.72 And the node at the center of the network was the imam himself: Nazim Mohammed. 
Not only was he a leading spiritual authority within the network, as well as a revered and 
feared veteran of the attempted 1990 coup in T&T; he also presided over his own quasi mini-
caliphate on the settlement he owns in the rural town of Rio Claro in the south-east of the 
country. It was from here that the majority of TIMs came or spent some time.  
The evolution of Nazim Mohammed’s network over the past twenty years remains somewhat 
of a mystery, given how secretive it is and that very little has been written about it. But its 
origins are fairly easy to specify: it emerged out of the break-up of the JAM after the failed 
coup of 1990. 
On 27 July of that fateful year in T&T’s history the JAM stormed into the nation’s Parliament 
in the capital city of Port of Spain and attempted to overthrow the government, shooting then-
Prime Minister Arthur Robinson and taking members of his cabinet hostage.73 Th  coup - the 
first insurrection in the west with an Islamist face - lasted six days, after which the JAM 
surrendered and the government regained control. 
According to the criminologist Daurius Figueira, the JAM started to unravel as soon as its 
leaders were arrested and put into custody. The divisions had always been there, he told me, 
but the pains and solitude of imprisonment brought them right out into the open. The core 
dispute, between Yasin Abu Bakr and the other leaders in the JAM, most notably Bilaal Ab-
dullah, was over the future direction of the group. By the summer of 1992, when the JAM 
were given a pardon (this was negotiated as a condition of its surrender during the siege) and 
released from prison, the group was violently and irremediably split. Abdullah left and creat-
ed his own group; he was to leave Trinidad for China not long after. And Nazim Mohammed, 
too, left, establishing his own community in Rio Claro. When I interviewed him in September 
2018, Mohammed told me: “We started as a little group and became part of the JAM [in 
1983], he [Yasin Abu Bakr] became our leader, but part of the agreement that we made with 
them is that, for we to be with you, Number 1, you, as imam, must lead a five-daily prayer. 
And Number 2, we don’t get involved in no politics or political parties.” According to Mo-
hammed, Bakr breached both of these conditions: “After the coup, when he came out of pris-
on, he [Bakr] stopped establishing the prayer, he stopped coming to the masjid [in Mucurapo 
on the outskirts of Port of Spain] and leading the prayer. We told him about it, he said he’d 
address it, he didn’t address it, and we called a meeting here [in Rio Claro] and I told him, 
‘listen, we can never carry on with you under this condition’, because in Islam the leader 
have to lead a 5 daily prayer...This is why we left them [the JAM].” Nazim also made it ex-
plicit that he disapproved of Bakr’s flirtation with the major political parties in Trinidad 
(Bakr and his group campaigned for the United National Congress - one of the country’s 
main political parties - in in the 1995 General Election). And he was “suspicious”, he said, 
about Bakr’s links with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who helped arm and train mem-
bers of the JAM. 
A former long-time associate of Mohammed corroborated this. “He [Mohammed] wanted to 
promote true Islam, according to his view, which is Wahhabi, and he felt very strongly that 
Yasin Abu Bakr and his group were more concerned with worldly matters than with dawah, 
so that’s why they broke”. In a paper on the JAM, published in the British Journal of 
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Criminology, the sociologist Cynthia Mahabir describes how the JAM, after 1990, 
transformed itself from an idealistic social movement - “a fraternity of ‘revolutionary men of 
Allah’” - into a criminal enterprise.74 According to the analyst Chris Zambelis, the JAM, 
from at least the mid-1990s on, became embroiled in “gangland-style slayings, narcotics and 
arms trafficking, money laundering, extortion, kidnapping, and political corruption”.75 
Commenting on the “criminal elements” within of the JAM, the former associate told me that 
Mohammed wanted nothing to do with this and so split from Bakr. 
In a revealing comment in his Dabiq interview, Crawford alluded to “a faction of Muslims in 
Trinidad” who “attempted to overthrow the disbelieving government but quickly surrendered, 
apostatized, and participated in the religion of democracy, demonstrating that they weren’t 
upon the correct methodology of jihad”.76 In T&T the JAM is widely regarded (and still 
feared) as a militant group, yet Crawford condemns it for not being militant enough, and for 
not practicing the right kind of Islam. Even more telling is that Crawford used to frequent 
Nazim Mohammed’s mosque, where he would have listened to the imam’s fiery sermons 
condemning democracy and calling for a purification of the faith.  
Consisting of around 350 like-minded individuals,77 the pro-ISIS network in T&T is located 
in three geographic areas: Diego Martin in the north-west, Enterprise and Longdenville in 
Chaguanas in the central west and Rio Claro in the south-east. At the center of the network 
were the 40 or more “bunches of guys”78 who migrated to Syria and Iraq, taking their wives 
and children with them. The majority were members of Nazim Mohammed’s mosque in Rio 
Claro. According to an anonymous police source, “The main link to Dawla [Islamic State] 
and Trinidad is Boos Masjid in Rio.” “Richplain [in Diego Martin] is the subgroup of Boos, 
but Rio is the main hub,” he added. Another source, who personally knows worshipers at the 
mosque, told me: “Nazim is the main man. It’s no secret. Everyone who I know that left to go 
[to Syria and Iraq] went to Rio to spend some time there first. Nazim is the main pivot man 
for ISIS.” 
For his own part, Mohammed has strenuously denied any association with ISIS, despite 
acknowledging that several members of his family travelled to Syria and Iraq in support of 
the caliphate. “I am hearing that I am a recruiter,” he told the Trinidad and Tobago Sunday 
Express.79 “But I am not sending anyone there. Perhaps they think I am a recruiter because I 
am outspoken, you see, but I am not recruiting anyone.”80 He reiterated the same denial when 
I interviewed him. 
Is Mohammed an ISIS recruiter? It is hard to know, but based on what several anonymous 
police sources told me he was certainly sympathetic toward the group’s ideological vision, 
defending the legitimacy of the caliphate in his sermons. This of course is not the same as 
saying he was selecting and then “grooming” would-be foreign fighters, but he helped lay the 
ideological ground for the migrations of scores of his followers to Syria and Iraq, many of 
whom lived under his patronage at the Boos settlement in Rio Claro. 
According to Fuad Abu Bakr (the son of the JAM leader), the idea that there is an ISIS 
recruiter in Trinidad is a myth. On the contrary, Fuad insisted, ISIS recruitment in T&T is 
bottom-up. “Listen,” he said, “there are facilitators, people who are there [in Syria and Iraq], 
they communicate to friends. Trinidad is small and the Muslim community is even smaller, 
so it’s basically friends, people you know, who are saying to you, “you know, do you want to 
come?” No big, bad recruiter.”81 This seems plausible enough, but it doesn’t explain why so 
many TIMs clustered around Rio Claro, where Mohammed operates. Hence the question of 
whether recruitment to ISIS in T&T was “bottom-up” or “top down” remains unresolved at 
this point. 
The second key contextual thread for understanding the origins of the 2013-16 migrations to 
Syria and Iraq is the growth, since the 1990s, of salafi fundamentalism in T&T. According to 
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Figueira, it is impossible to understand the migrations without placing them into this broader 
ideological context: 
 
It is the by-product of years of work done by the House of Saud financing a program 
of indoctrination into Wahhabi Islam in Trinidad and Tobago. They’ve spent money 
and brought in all of these Wahhabi scholars from Mecca, they’ve passed on the 
doctrine, then they’ve started to take the young males and send them to Mecca, and 
then they came back indoctrinated and they continue, so now you don’t even need to 
send missionaries again.82 
 
The former T&T politician Nafeesa Mohammed, in a recent talk at the University of the West 
Indies in Trinidad, echoed a similar concern about the radicalizing impact of Saudi-funded 
Wahhabism on T&T Muslim communities: 
 
There is a discernable turning point in our country from the days when we were 
basically a traditional moderate Muslim society with three or four main Muslim 
orgnisations to a point where now, there has been a rise of fundamentalism and…now 
have about 50 groups and organisations, and a great measure of disunity and discord 
within the Muslim community…I have tried to link it to my own personal experiences 
at our Masjid and I can trace it to the day when Saudi Arabia became so very wealthy 
in the 1990s with the oil money that they started to pump money into the Western 
world, and a lot of the foreign ideologies then started to seep into our Masjid.83 
 
Many Muslims I interviewed in T&T relayed the same observation, most notably an imam in 
the south of the country who fought for many months against a salafi takeover of his mosque. 
The T&T state has watched this development with relative indifference, probably out of a 
principled commitment to religious freedom that that is enshrined in the country’s 
constitution and a mixture of apathy and tolerance that are endemic in the culture of T&T. 
It is scarcely an accident, then, that one of most prominent Trinidadians who joined ISIS was 
a graduate of the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Ashmead Choate, a former 
principal of the Darul Quran Wal Hadith Islamic School, in central-west Trinidad, was in his 
late 50s when he departed from Trinidad. In his Dabiq interview Crawford credited him with 
furthering his path to jihad: “By Allah’s grace, there was a man of sound knowledge who I 
was able to refer to and who would answer any questions I had. His name was Shaykh 
Ashmead Choate and he had studied hadith and graduated from one of the Islamic colleges in 
the Middle East. He made hijrah [migration] to the Islamic State and attained martyrdom 
fighting in Ramadi.”84 
It is hard to gauge the degree of Choate’s influence on the radical Islamist milieu in T&T, 
since the circles in which he moved are so secretive and closed to outsiders. Daurius Figueira 
suspects that Choate, with his extensive contacts in the Middle East, was not only an 
ideological mentor to Crawford and his associates but also the crucial link between TIMs and 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq. A relative of Choate told me, “Some days it seemed that his entire day 
was on a phone. What I can say was that he knew practically all of the men who left for 
Syria.”85 
Another ideological figure that looms large over the radical Islamist scene in T&T is 
Abdullah el-Faisal, a pro-ISIS Jamaican cleric who is currently facing charges in the U.S. for 
allegedly acting as a facilitator for ISIS.86 El-Faisal is believed to have acted as a mentor to 
the Jamaican-born British national Jermaine Lindsay, who detonated a bomb on a Tube train 
near King’s Cross, killing 26 passengers, in the 7 July 2005 London bombings.87 
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Umar Abdullah, head of the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah and former flatmate of Milton Algernon, 
where they lived together on the Boos settlement in Rio Claro, described to me not only how 
the caliphate declaration in 2014 electrified many of Nazim Mohammed’s followers, but also 
how their prior immersion in the thinking of el-Faisal had primed that response. “We used to 
get a copy of every lecture he [el-Faisal] gave,” Abdullah said, “because he had a close 
relationship with Imam Nazim. And we used to listen to those lectures over and over. And in 
those lectures there was a lot of radical rhetoric…A lot of brothers were radicalized as a 
result of listening to his lectures.”88 
It also seems likely that el-Faisal had a relationship with Sean Parson, helping him marry 
(over Skype) a 32 year-old Philadelphia-based American woman named Keonna Thomas.89 
Whether or not el-Faisal radicalized Parson is unclear. 
In 2009 Nazim Mohammed came under the radar of the FBI, when agents visited his mosque 
prior to the Fifth Summit of the Americas, which took place that year in Port of Spain. “They 
came here, right here in this masjid. They said their President (Barack Obama) was coming 
here and wanted to determine whether I was a threat. Very sophisticated men. Spoke Arabic,” 
Mohammed said.90 The authorities in T&T would have known about this visit, just as they 
would have known about Mohammed’s proselytizing. Yet it seems they were not sufficiently 
worried to do anything about it. This is puzzling, especially given the dark history of Islamist 




Several implications follow form the data presented in this article. One is to do with the 
genuinely global reach of ISIS and its ability to appeal to a dizzyingly diverse rang of actors 
from countries that differ markedly from one another. However fringe ISIS was and remains 
within the wider Islamic world, it nevertheless succeeded in framing its grievances and 
ambitions in a way that was understood across many different countries and cultures. 
Another implication is to do with the intersection between the local and the global in jihadist 
foreign traveller mobilizations. For all the global reach of ISIS, its ability to attract devotees 
and foreign labor-power is shaped profoundly by the local circumstances of the countries in 
which its message finds a receptive audience, however small. But these circumstances differ 
from place to place, and any attempt to understand the vicissitudes of ISIS recruitment in 
each must attend to the specificities of the local circumstances in question. For example, any 
adequate macro-explanation of ISIS recruitment in western Europe must arguably address the 
blunt human reality of Muslim immigration and what it means to be a second generation 
Muslim in a secular and largely homogenous society91 which offers them few opportunities 
for economic advancement.92 However, such a focus is unlikely to offer much promise for 
explaining ISIS radicalization and recruitment in T&T, an ethnically diverse country where 
there are no diasporic Muslim communities, where there has been no secularist push-back 
against religious values or Muslims, and where the majority of pro-ISIS supporters are from 
economically stable indigenous Muslim families in rural areas. 
In the T&T context the question that needs answering is not why alienated young men in their 
early twenties with little to lose would be willing to leave their home nations to join ISIS, but 
why men and women in their mid-thirties, many with decent jobs and young families, would 
be willing to leave their settled and rooted lives in T&T to join ISIS.  
To answer this is well beyond the scope of this article, but the T&T case does serve to 
highlight just how culturally bounded western radicalization discourse is, with its 
characteristic narrative focus on poor, rootless, angry young Muslims lurking in the shadows 
of a strange and hostile urban landscape. 
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As we have seen, experts on foreign fighter radicalization make a distinction between “push” 
and “pull” factors:93 between the positive things about a radical group that attracts people to it 
– the “pull” factors - and the negative things about a group that alienates people from it and 
makes them seek out radical alternatives - the “push” factors. If the TIMs were “pushed”, 
what were the relevant pushing mechanisms? And if they were “pulled”, what were the 
relevant points of attraction? No doubt there was a combination of both pushes and pulls. But 
poverty, rootlessness, anti-Muslim bigotry and sexual repression do not seem to be among 
them. Most were married. Most were financially secure. And none had experienced the 
difficulties of adapting to a host society that routinely demanded and questioned their loyalty. 
Above all, the data in the article resoundingly supports a growing body of research that 
emphasizes the crucial role of social networks in facilitating radicalization and foreign fighter 
mobilizations. Everyone in T&T who left for Syria and Iraq was part of the same network. 
No one self-radicalized and no one left for Syria without the support of the network. 
Moreover, the origins of this network long predated ISIS and can be traced to the fracturing, 
in the mid-1990s, of another militant Islamist group – the JAM. 
There is still much that we do not know about this network, including who helped finance it 
and who helped connect TIMs with the relevant ISIS contacts in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. 
Nazim Mohammed’s extended family was clearly a central node but it remains to be seen 
who within it was most active both in proselytizing for ISIS and in organizing its migration – 
and perhaps that of other families - to Syria and Iraq. We also know very little about the role 
played by women in the network. At least two women insist that they were deceived by their 
husbands into going to Syria.94 Yet many others, based on their social media accounts, were 
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